The majority of the published attacks on reduced-round variants of block ciphers seeks to maximize the number of rounds to be broken, using less data than the entire codebook and less time than exhaustive key search. In this paper, a novel key partitioningchosen plaintext attack against reduced-rounds AES variants up to 3 rounds that uses only 33 chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs, a workload of 2 19 (for three round variant) and 2 17 bytes of memory is introduced. The attack depends upon the internal structure of the AES round function, the differential characteristics of the AES S-BOX and thekey partitioning in which each key byte will be processed individually independent to the other key bytes. To clarify the idea of the attack we will follow a round by round cryptanalysis till the third round of the AES. The results gives that a bit-level permutation is more efficient than byte-level permutation used in the AES round function.We also introduce a counter measure for this attack by using a bit-level permutation on the AES round function instead a byte level permutation.
Introduction:
No practical attacks against AES are known to date, but an increasing number of them are now getting close to become practical. Recent attempts using related key boomerang attack techniques have received a lot attention. At the very end of May 2009, a paper was published by A. Biryukov and D. Khovratovich [1] describing a potential attack on AES based on a related key boomerang attack. Although not currently practical to break AES it was the first attack to be more efficient than pure brute force by lowering the AES-256 complexity from 2 256 to 2 119 and AES-192 complexity from 2 192 to 2 176 . Shortly after this paper was published another major breakthrough in the cryptanalysis of AES was made public in August 2009 [2] by an extended team responsible for the first paper; and this time it is almost practical against some variants of AES-256. Respectively using a 9 and 10 rounds variants they lowered the complexity to 2 39 and 2 45 . Recently in mid-2011, Charles Bouillaguetet al [3] considered low data complexity attacks on reduced-round variants of AES. He presented several attacks on up to four rounds of AES given at most 10 known (or chosen) plaintexts, and showed how to leverage such attacks to more complex attacks on variants of AES with more rounds, the results of these attacks will be illustrated shortly in section 4.
AES S-BOX differential characteristics:
The differential characteristics [4, 5] of the AES S-BOX is a word means that, what is the probability of a specific input difference to the S-BOX for a given S-BOX output difference. For any output difference ∆Y the probability of the occurrence of an input difference ∆X equals to "0" in 129 values out of 256 possible values for ∆X which is called impossible differential [6, 7] , equals to " " in 126 values out 256 and " " in only one value of ∆X. These semi-ideal differential characteristics give us an indication to how hard is the differential cryptanalysis of the AES, also it tells us why the AES is immune against differential cryptanalysis since a huge number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs are required to complete the attack because of the very small bias found in the difference distribution impossible differentials, the attack shall consider this fact as will be discussed shortly.
Proposed attack
The proposed key partitioning chosen plaintext attack is introduced in this section. We will start with a single round AES variant, then we will extend that attack to two and three rounds AES variants.
Proposed attack for a single round AES variant:
The main idea of the proposed attack depends upon a novel principle called key partitioning, in key partitioning each key byte is processed independent to the other key bytes, this principle depends upon the initial add round key before the first round, to describe what we want to do we shall choose the two plaintext pairs listed in Table ( 1), also the target key matrix is listed. The encryption process of the two chosen plaintext pairs with the target key shall give us two encryption paths.The first will force the key by itself to be the input of the first round (after the initial add round key).The other will do the same except for the first key byte which is complemented under the effect of the "FF" byte in the plaintext.We will go through from here for the key point of the attack and look to what will happen. After initial add round key we will get the result listed in Table ( 2). Note that the only difference is at the first byte only (W 00 ) which appears by itself in the first encryption path for plain'1' and complemented at second encryption path for plain'2', at the end of the first round (substitute bytes, shift rows, mix-columns and add round key operations) we will get the results shown in Tables (3,4 ). Now we have the output of the first round for both encryption paths, it is obviously can be noticed that for any key value the output for the two chosen Equation (1) is valid for any key value after the first round.Now to get the first key byte "W 00 " we need to know the byte which has a substitution value when XORed with the substitution value of its complement satisfies the obtained value.It doesn't seem to be a complicated process.To simplify it we can construct a new table that holds the substitutions for each of a 128 possibilities out of 256 XORed with the substitution of their complement and hence 128 possibilities are enough since all combinations will be covered.The operation of finding the first key byte "W 00 " will be a simple look-up.
After we find a match, we shall have a one out of two correct first key byte value (W 00 ) and the other is its complement, we need to know which one is correct.Simply we use any of them as the first byte of the plain-text again and apply a single round AES encryption.Hence we have two possible situations after the initial add round key (00 x ) or (FF x ) then the byte will have the two possible values listed in equations (2) Where "X" Є {16 x , 63 x }, which can be rearranged to :
Since the left hand side is known, "X" has to be either (16 x ) or (63 x ), the first leads to the correct first key byte value (W 00 ) and the other is the complement of it, else the other value is the one. This Attack can recover the full key by 16 iterations by moving the byte in difference from the first location to the second till the sixteenth byte, each byte is found independently and that is the complete definition of the key partitioning principle.
Proposed attack for two rounds AES variant:
We have illustrated the single round AES attack, now we will show how to extend the attack against 2-round AES variant.We will keep the steps of the previous attack to the second round.Let us analyze what will happen in the second round, for simplicity we will name the output of the first round as matrices " " and " " for the two encryption paths, hence the input to the second round is as listed in Table (5) . Now we will get the output of the second round as we did for the first round, the results are illustrated in Tables(6,7 ). 
Table (7):The output of the second round
Now we can analyze the output of the second round for the two encryption paths, they will theme to be different if you look at the experimental result. But the analytical results here shows that the difference is only in one term per each corresponding cipher bytes, so as we did for the single round, we can apply for the 2-round AES as follows:
Equation (6) represents an output difference from the S-BOX, hence we can call the differential characteristics as was discussed section 2.We have 127 solutions by looking to the difference distribution table of the AES S-BOX, but we have a condition that should be met only for the correct values, for each input difference { } possible for the output difference { } should give a value that lies in the complement pair difference table, but this is not enough to uniquely determine the correct value. So we will use another pair to act as a distinguisher for the correct value, the first byte of the plain block of that pair is chosen to be "F0" that will give which is a first nibble complement of after the initial add round key, the output of that pair can be represented as given in Table (7) . So we need to do the same analysis to that pair, finally we will have:
The second encryption path (plain 2) The number of chosen pairs = 33 pairs (33*16=528 bytes)
Proposed attack against three rounds AES variant:
In this section we will get the output of the third round similarlylike we get for second round.We will name the output of the second round given in Tables  (6,7 )by a matrices "2"& " ". Also, we should consider that the input blocks to the third round are totally different from each other's, but we must recall that there are factors in common.
The first step to step back from the third to the second round given the output difference of the third round is to reverse the mix-columns operation.We have the states difference not the states, but we can proof that the inverse mixcolumns operation of the state's difference equals to the difference of the inverse mix-columns operation for each state individually [8] . For a given State "S i " and a given round key "W j ": The key partitioning principle is introduced to attack up to three rounds AES variant.It depends on a weak point in the AES architecture.Since the AES round function executes a byte level permutation rather than bit level permutation,we could divide our effort to process each byte individually.This operation could be more complicated if a bit level permutation is performed in the AES round function.
In the future work, we are planning to extend the proposed attack to more round of the AES. We shall consider the use of practically feasible memory resources rather than the theoretical ones used by other attacks to achieve lower complexity of the extended attacks.
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